Intercept Modernisation

Back in May, I wrote to my MP concerning the Intercept Modernisation Programme. Essentially this is a plan to collect internet traffic data from everyone and store it within one giant Governmental database.

"Dear MP,

I am writing to express my concern at the proposed Intercept
Modernisation Programme. I understand this may contain plans to collect
details of who I send emails to and the people I contact via Facebook
and other social networking sites.

I understand that there are also discussions around centralising all
internet traffic data in one government database, or gaining permanent
easy access to the data being held by Internet Service Providers.

I believe this is likely to be an expensive waste of time, and a gross
invasion of citizens’ privacy. There will be serious risks if a large
number of civil servants can access extremely personal information,
such as who someone contacts by email or Facebook message. Although I
presume there would continue to be legal barriers, in practice we all
know that it is possible, once information is made accessible, for
information to be wrongly accessed, distributed or lost.

I am also convinced that any serious criminal or terrorist will not use
normal email or social networking sites to plan and communicate about
their activities. Collection of information will, however, make it much
more routine to use anonymisation and encryption technologies to hide
their activities. This will mean the proposals will make it harder, not
easier, to get evidence.

At the same time, It is possible that legitimate protesters and
campaigners will use normal electronic communications, which puts these
people carrying out legal activities at risk of abuse.

I am also concerned about the possibility that such information will be
analysed for suspicious patterns, in processes called ‘data mining’.
This would put many innocent people under scrutiny. As Bruce Schneier,
the renowned security expert says:

“Terrorist plots are different … attacks are very rare. This means that
even very accurate systems will be so flooded with false alarms that
they will be useless: millions of false alarms for every one real
attack, even assuming unrealistically accurate systems.”

http://www.schneier.com/essay-163.html

Fundamentally, ‘traffic data’ is an integral and private part of any
communication, as the European Court of Human Rights has already
agreed. Collecting it, storing it and analysing it must be done only to
address very serious concerns of public safety, targeted at
individuals, not in order to carry out mass surveillance.

I urge you to bring these concerns to the light of Jacqui Smith, the
Home Secretary

Yours sincerely,

Ram"

On the 3rd of September I recieved a letter back from my MP, along with a letter from David Hanson, Minister of State for Policing, Crime and Counter Terrorism. It reads as follows:

"As you may be aware the police and other public authorities specified under Part I Chapter II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 can already get critical communications data from communications service providers, such as telephone companies, to help them solve crimes. This 'communications data' covers information such as when calls are made, by expressly does not include the content of those calls.

Communications data is used in order to prevent and detect crime on a day-to-day basis - including serious crimes and terrorism. A recent example of the use of communications data is that of Levi Bellfield who was tied to the murder of Amelie Delagrange through information about when and where he was using his mobile phone. He was later tried and convicted for her murder.

However, the way we communicate with one another is changing rapidly. The development of the potential of the internet ad internet technology by the communications industry has led to an explosion in the number of communications, and the different ways people communicate. These developments, which are driven by technological change, will increasingly undermine our current capability to obtain communications data and use it to protect the public.

The Interception Modernisation Programme (IMP) is a cross-government programme led by the Home Office. It was established in response to the then Prime Minister's National Security Remit in 2006, to maintain the Government's interception and communications data capabilities during this time of rapid technological change.

The IMP is about maintaining our existing communications data and interception capabilities - whilst balancing the right to privacy with protecting public safety. It is working closely with the UK's law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies and with industry stakeholders to research and identity and strategic solution to maintain the UK's Interception and communications data capabilities, in the face of widespread changes in technology.

It is clearly important to safeguard these important capabilities to protect the public in the changing technological environment, but also to ensure that the balance between privacy and security is struck correctly. Any proposals that the government brings forward will of course address the very important issues relating to the privacy and security of personal data and will be fully compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998.

On 27 April 2009 the then Home Secretary launched the consultation 'Protecting the Public in a Changing Communications Environment'. This consultation sought to help the public understand how valuable communications data is to protecting them. It also looked at what changes are taking place in the industry that threaten our capabilities in this area, and sought views on the options that are available - and the safeguards that will naturally be needed to apply to any proposals that we bring forward. The Government's intention was that we take this opportunity to listen to the public and understand their concerns and views on this.

The consultation closed on 20 July and we will consider the responses before deciding how best to proceed.

David Hanson".

How lucky it was that I was able to read the consultation before I received the letter, because despite writing in May, I didn't get the reply until September. I shall post my reply, should I write again here. Have no doubt about that.